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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEVON PATRICK HARDCASTLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
NELDON HARDCASTLE, 
Defendant and Resp~ondent, 
and 
ORDELL HARDCASTLE, 
Interpleaded Defendant atnd 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
7423 
Appellant's statement of facts, on the material is-
sues here, is subject to the observation that it sometimes 
states, as facts, the testimony of ap·pellant 's witnesses, 
even though these were controverted, or the testimony 
of appellant was such that the court was not required to 
believe it and did not find it to be true. 
Chronologically, and on non-controverted matters, 
the statement is reasonably accurate. It will be corrected, 
and supplemented, 'briefly, on some matters deemed to be 
material to the issue involved. 
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2 
The findings recited ''that through the action of 
I 
the Juvenile Court, both parties here were on the 13th 
day of September, 1944, deprived of the custody of the 
minor child of the parties hereto, and the custody of 
the said child was awarded to 0Tdell Hardcastle, the 
mother of the defendant herein, and that said child, since 
the date of said order of the Juvenile Court, to-wit, Sep-
tember 13, 1944, has lived with and has been cared for 
by the said Or dell Hardcastle.'' 
It was then ordered and decreed that Ordell Hard-
castle, the said grandmother, be and she was by the 
decree unconditionally ''awarded the care, custody, and 
control of the minor child . . . Janet, age 2% years.'' 
At the time of the Juvenile Court proceeding, afore-
said, N eldon Ha.dcastle, the father, was overseas in 
the Service, an.d was not in a position to care for the 
child, except as he had provided an allotment out of his 
servi·ce pay to the child's mother. 
The child had, in fact, been cared for by its grand-
mother ahnost continuously from the time that it was 
born. 
It is true that De Von testified that she did not know 
anything about any proceeding in the Juvenile Court, 
but she also testified (122) that the Red Cross, soon after 
her arrival in Portland, in September of 1944, was ask-
ing her ''to send the money to the Judge,'' and to sign 
a slip, so that the Judge would get some of the money, 
and that she did so. This could only be the Judge of the 
J uvenille Court, as no other proceedings were pending at 
that time. N eldon testified ( 17 4) that in response to 
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3 
his letter to her to n1ake the $30.00 available for Janet, 
De Von \vrot that he should not ''·try to give his mother 
all the credit; that she had already arranged, through the 
Juvenile Court, to have the $30.00 sent to my mother." 
By the statute, the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction 
\vould depend upon its determination of neglect or de-
pendency. It awarded the custody of Janet to Ordell 
Hardcastle, its grandmother, in 1944. While the Judge 
referred to this as being a temporary arrangement, it 
\Ya:s apparently temporary, awaiting the return of 
Janet's father from the Service. The Red Cross had been 
working in connection with the Juvenile Court, and had 
been investigating De \7-on in ApTil and May of 1944, 
while she was till here ( 273). 
Issues in this Case: 
It is important to note that this case arises on a 
petition to modify the divorce decree entered at the 
instances of De \Ton Hardcastle, the plaintiff, on May 8, 
1946.· It has to be assumed, on this proceeding, that there 
wa~ good ground for placing the custody, as it was 
ordered in that decree. This procedure has to be based 
on changed conditions, affecting the child, after that 
decree was entered. This seems to be uniformly held, 
and has been the position that has been taken by this 
Court, under the provision of our statute giving the 
District Court jurisdiction over the matter of the pro-
perty and children of divorced parents. 
Osmus v. Osmu.s, 198 P. (2) 233. 
'rhe petition here a;ppears to recognize this situation. 
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4· 
It alleges one change ; this is a change in the financial 
condition in the mother, DeVon. 
It does allege that the home of the grandrnother is 
not a satisfactory home for the child, but does not allege 
any changes in the conditions there, after the fortner 
decree in 1948. 
As to the home, the evidence shows,- without dispute; 
that the conditions, as referred to in the allegation of 
the petition, have steadily improved; that, at the time the 
child was originally placed therein, there were eight 
children of the Hardcastles there, and that, at the time 
of the filing of this petition, there were. only four of 
their children ( 121) ; that the house, as indicated by the 
appellant's statement here, had been somewhat remod-
eled; that running water had been placed therein ; that 
bath and toilet fixtures had been acquired and were ready 
for installation, when the necessary help could be ob-
tained. 
It is alleged in the petition, in paragraph 2 thereof, 
that, when the decree was entered, it was agreed and 
understood ''he tween plaintiff, defendant and the said 
Ordell that plaintiff could have the custody of her child 
whenever her circumstances were such as to enable her 
to properly ~p~rovide for said child and furnis:Q. her with 
a suitable home.'' There was no evidence to support this 
allegation, whatsoever. 
The only evidence on the matter at all was an inti-
mation on the part of DeVon's own attorney, upon her 
testimony, that she might take some proceeding later to 
get the child. It is very evident that any effort on her 
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part, at that tirne, would have bee~ seriously resisted by 
Keldon, the father of Janet. Her testimony showed that, 
when it \Yas indicated in the first cornplaint that the 
custody \Yould not be given to his mother ( 195), he went 
out and hired an attorne)~, ~1r. Critchlow. That he was 
prepared to fight out the matter of taking the custody 
fron1 Or dell ( 195-197) .. 
So, this petition rests entirely on the sole issue 
presented, as to the. alleged improved financial condi-
tion of De\; on. No authority has been cited that this is 
sufficient to modify a custody decree, and the cases, 
as \Ve shall show, are strongly to the contrary. 
This is also a case where an attempt is made, on this 
ground alone, to 1nodify a decree, so as to permit the 
removal of a child from the jurisdiction of the Court, 
and frou1 the State, and from the place of residence of 
the other parent. 
There are many cases, where such attempt at · re-
moval has been held to be ground for modifying a decree, 
so as to keep the child within the jurisdiction· of the 
Court. On the other hand, the cases have consistently 
held that, wherever possible, the child should be kept 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Alley v. Alley, 247 P. 301. In this case, this Court, 
at Page 304 of this report, said: 
''. . . There is no good reason made to ap-
pear in this case why the father should longer 
be deprived of the custody and control of his own 
child. In every case where the welfare of a child 
of tender age is in question, the courts should 
rx(lreise great care to subserve the best interests 
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of such child, and in determining the question of 
custody and control should, if possible, always 
maintain control of the child and retain it within 
the jurisdiction of the court so as to protect it 
against harmful influences and to preserve its 
welfare and the rights of all interested parties. 
There is nothing 1nade to appear in this case, 
however, which would affect the welfare of the 
child by giving it into the custody· of the natural 
father.'' 
In this case, it has been developed, also, as affect-
ing the alleged right of the mother, that there was com-
plete abandonment by her of the custody of the child, 
as early as 1943. We will develop this point on the argu-
ment. 
Further St-atement: 
It is stated, by app~ellant, in connection with the 
above matter, that Ordell Hardcastle refused to let the 
child go, and that she stated that a sheriff would be re-
quired to take the child away. 
This was after the child, and its clothes, chair, and 
basket and birth-certificate, had been definitely turned 
over to Ordell, with the statement that she could have 
Janet, and that DeVon would sign any papers for that 
purpose. 
It should also be considered, in the light of the 
statement by the respondent (p. 3), of the fact that 
DeVon's father had threatened the baby and had beaten 
her. Also, that the child's father had learned of this, 
while still in this country in the Service. ( 172)), and had 
written to his mother to take care of the baby. Also, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
in connection with the fact that 0Tdell was advised that 
appellant had stated to the sheriff that appellant would 
rather kill the baby than have Ordell keep her, and that 
the sheriff had 'varned Or dell to watch the baby ( 267). 
It is certain, fron1 the very character of Or dell, as 
i~ indica ted by this record, that, under those circum-
stances, including the request of her son, she would have 
fought to protect J a.net. 
This temporary demand for the baby, prior to 
De \Ton's leaving for Portland, and after being piqued 
because of the argument with Bonnie, was, doubtless, as 
Or dell testified, a ''passing fancy'' ( 266). 
It is inconsistent for appellant to argue that the 
reason she did not want the child was because she had no 
place to keep her in her quarters at Portland, and, also, 
that she really \vanted the child at that tilne. 
The fact, as disclosed from this record, is that she 
never really 'vanted her until 1948, when she thought 
she had gained some affluence, and that then, it was not 
because of any great love or affection for the child, but, 
rather, to show her mother-in-law, and the neighbors, 
that she had procured a position of some standing and 
power. This is, apparently, tinged with some indication 
of jealousy or resentment. 
ARGUMENT 
We will pursue appellant's points, in the order pre-
~ented. In discussing the first point, we will assume that 
the Court's findings, as questioned by appellant in later 
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points, are fully sustained by the record. We will es-
tablish this, as these points are each taken up. 
POIN'T NO. I 
On this point, appellant states that she is aware 
that'' in many cases, financial ability is viewed with lim-
ited concern." This is true, and the change in such con-
dition is, clearly, the only change that can be relied upon 
here. App·ellant cites no case in which any custody 
decree has been changed by reason of such changed 
condition. 
We agree that the welfare of the child is a controlling-
factor. We do not agree that such welfare is determined 
by a temporary affluence of a second husband of the 
mother. 
We agree that it has been determined that the 
mother has no absolute right to the custody of a child. 
Samps·ell v. Holt, 202 P. (2) 550. 
Appellant has cited some cases where custody was 
awarded to the mother, for reasons which do not exist 
here. We have no quarrel with the law quoted therefrom. 
These eases do not deal, at all, with the question o.f 
changing a decree on the ground of financial change, 
alone. 
We will now cite a few of the ''many cases,'' as 
referred to by appellant. These are picked out of the 
Fifth Decennial, Vol. 17, beginning at Page 505. 
Myers_ v. Myers, 179 S.W. (2) 865 (Arkansas). A 
betterment in financial condition of mother since entry 
of divorce decree awarding custody of son to father was 
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of little significance as constituting a "'change in circunl-
stances' · requiring transfer of custody to mother, since 
eourt had ample jurisdiction to require father to provide 
for child, even if custody was awarded to mother. 
lVilliants ·z'. Willia~ns, 51 N.E. (2) 284, 320 Ill. App. 
35-±. 'Vhere a father \Yas contributing amply to the 
support of an infant son whose custody had been awarded 
to the n1other by divorce decree, that infant n1ight he 
deprived of a re1nainder interest in a trust valued at 
$125,000 unle~s child's custody be transferred to the 
father \vas entitled to little consideration in determining 
\velfare of the child. 
Leve.rich c. Le,z:erich, 152 P. (2) 303 (Oregon). This 
is one of the cases above referred to. We quote: 
d ~Ioreover, the appellant has failed to show 
a change of conditions, since the entry of the 
decree, which would warrant the court in modify-
ing it \Vith res·pect to custody of the child. It is 
the ~ettled rule that such decrees are final, and 
may not be modified unless changed conditions 
are shown, indicating, to the satisfaction of the 
court, that the modification would be for the best 
inteTests of the child. (Citing authorities). The 
burden of making such a showing was upon the 
appellant, who was the moving party. (Citing 
authority). She failed to sustain it. The only 
showing of changed conditions which she made 
was that she herself is now married to the man 
for 'vhon1 she left her first husband, and that 
they have acquired a desirable residence. She 
made no attempt whatever to show that the child's 
father was in any respect incompetent to ca.re for 
it. The party seeking the change should sho'v 
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that the other party has become unfit to be the 
custodian, or, at the least, that the proposed 
change in custody would result in the child's 
receiving better care than he is receiving from 
the other. (Citing authorities). l\lere improve-
ment in financial or other material circumstances 
of the party denied custody of the child is not 
sufficient in itself to justify a change. (Citing 
authority).'' 
Schorno v. Schorno, 172 P. (2) 474. Where the court 
said: 
''The fact that respondent's financial stand-
ing has very greatly improved would not afford 
any ground whatever for taking the young chil-
dren from appellant. . . . Respondent argues 
that he desires to train the boys to become dairy 
farmers, and, in due time, to send them to college 
to continue their technical training. Questions of 
this nature may become im;portant several years 
in the future, but, at this time, are unimportant." 
The qualities of industry, character, stability, and 
good citizenship, in which the Courts and the State are 
interested, do not result from affluence. They are pro-
moted by su.ch care and training and treatment as Janet 
has received and will receive where she is. 
Something is attempted to be made of the fact that 
De Von is the natural mother, and Ordell the grand-
mother. This is not at all .conclusive as to the welfare 
of Janet. The grandmother is a blood relationship. 
DeVon has been the mother only in that she gave birth 
to Janet. Here, the grandmother watched over the birth, 
and provided, and paid for, the hospitalization, including 
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extra 1noney for a priYate roon1 because De\' on srnoked, 
( 2S:2) and, fron1 then on, Ordell has been the real n1other 
in every respect. 
Janet calls her '~ 11 ama ·' ( 180). She is the only real 
mother this child has eYer known. Here is the only real 
home the child has ever had. She took her out of trouble 
\vhen she \Vas a month, or less old, and vvhen she, with 
her birth certificate, vvas turned over, and nursed her 
to health. She has protected and fed and clothed her 
provided insurance for her medical treatments, and cared 
for her in danger and sickness ( 245) ; even that occa-
sioned by her fear that De 'Ton would take her away 
(233); has looked after religious training, and, at five 
years, her kindergarten training ( 239). This record shows 
there could hardly be a better mother. The neighbors 
all ~ay so. They testify, also, to. the deep feeling of affec-
tion existing between this grandmother and the child. The 
Court found this ''deep and enduring love'' to exist ( 49). 
It would take too much space to cite all the evidence, 
showing the love of Janet for her grandmother, or her 
reciprocal love. It could hardly be deeper, or more ger~­
uine ( 244). Janet's father testified that "she loves 
. .._ 
mother Inore than she will ever love me or her mother'' 
( 176), and "they are about as close as two peoi_Ple can 
get" ( 181) . 
He, incidentally, has shown much more affe-ction and 
I 
concern for Janet's welfare than has DeVon. He has 
visited her once, or more weekly, as stated by respon-
dent; has taken her to his home a few times, but could 
not keep her, because she wanted to get back to 0-rdell 
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immediately (181). He has petitioned and testified, ask-
ing that she be kept within the Court's jurisdiction., 
where the Court can protect her, and here, where he can 
see that she is taken care of. He should know of Janet's 
\ 
feelings, and he says that, to take her away, would 
break the hearts of both her and her grandmother ___ _ 
Janet ''would die.'' (181). 
Appellant's counsel got one neighbor witness, on 
cross-examination, to say that t.T anet was a sort of 
• 'happy-go-lucky child.'' On this is expressed an opinon 
that she would go along and forget about everything, 
and readjust. Perhaps this is assumed in Russia's sepa-
ration of families, also, but it is not so. It is not based 
on an understanding of the feeling of children of this 
age, or of Janet's feelings. Adjustment by her, or her 
grandmother, to a world without each other, would be 
far from easy. 
There is no difference in the shock that would occur 
to this child, if taken from her home and grandmother, 
than that to any normal child, taken from its own devoted 
mother. Perhaps, it would he greater, because she has 
had to fight this fear, on different occasions, upon 
reports from neighbors, and at the time of the Juvenile 
Court hearing in 1948, when she spoke for herself (180}, 
and at which time she became hysterical, and would cry 
out in the night the whole time her mother was here, 
and became ill. ( 233). 
'This is emphasized further, as is also the kind of 
child she has come to be, by her acts to protect herself; 
such as the occasion when she went from Sunday School 
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to the hon1e of Bishop Hardcastle, her uncle, in order that 
her n1other 'vould not kno\Y ''"here to find .her ( 164, 166, 
235) ; and the occasion when she went to the neighbor 
( 159-160), and undertook to arrange for their dog to 
protect her. 
Somewhat similar situations to this one have been 
discussed in the following cases, decided by this Court. 
State v. Sorensen, 132 P. (2) 132. The child had been 
placed with the Sorensens, and the father thought to 
regain possession on allegations that conditions had 
changed, since the finding of the Juvenile Court that ·~he 
child "\Yas neglected. 
This Court referred to certain prior Utah cases, dis-
cussing the alleged paramount right of a parent, and 
stated that the principles therein were not applicable to 
the situation presented; that there was no presurnption 
of this kind which could prevail against the interests 
and welfare of the child; and a number of other case, 
in which a parent was attempting to regain possession 
and custody of a minor child decreed to others, and said: 
"It thus app·ears that where an order of the 
court has been n1ade awarding custody of a minor 
child to a particular indiyidual, such order will 
not thereafter be modified without showing a 
change in conditions or circumstances meriting 
such modification.'' 
Kurtz v. Christensen, 209 P. 340. In this case, the 
child was illegitimate, and the mother, being abandoned 
by the father, consented that the child be adopted by the 
(lefendants. They were not related to the child. They 
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kept the child for about three years, when the parents 
were reunited and married, and brought the action to 
obtain possession. The opinon of the Court said: 
''In this case we are constantly reminded, in 
the brief and argument of plaintiffs' counsel, that 
by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs are 
natural parents the law favors them. It is also 
contended in plaintiff's behalf that their social 
station and their financial ability to care for and 
properly rear their own child equal those of the 
defendants; that these considerations, coupled 
with the admitted fact that since the birth of 
the child plaintiff's have become husband and \vife 
and are very much de,- nted to each other, should 
have prompted the trial court to overlook all their 
past indiscretions and to give back to them the 
child of their own flesh and blood to nurture and 
rear to womanhood. 'The entering into the 
marriage relation and the present attitude of the 
plaintiffs toward each other are most commend-
able, For these things the whole world must ap-
plaud.'' 
''The undispua ted facts are that the home 
environments of this little child are now most 
ideal. That they will continue to be, and that she 
will be reared to a splendid womanhood with the 
defendants, seems assured. She knows no other 
parents, and her affections are so entwined with 
theirs that a separation would mean the uproot-
ing of all that makes for the good and happiness 
of child life. The plaintiffs' previous conduct 
alone has brought about her present relationship 
to the defendants.'' 
The Court says that there was nothing to justify 
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breaking the alliance w·hich had thus gro"\vn up. It also 
points out that, where a parent has surrenderd her child 
in infancy, and it has been allo,ved to ren1ain with others 
until ne\v ties of mutual affe.ction are formed, the child's 
welfare 'vill control the parents' rights. 
Wallick v. v;an.ce, 289 P. 103. In this case, the father 
gave the child to the child's grandmother and to his 
sister, with the apparent intention of their having perma-
nent custody. The child's mother had died, when the 
child was thirteen months old. About that time, her 
father took the child to her grandmother's ho~e. 
He claimed there was no agreement to leave the 
child permanently; she was merely left there. The father 
afterward married, and obtained a position, and sought 
the child, on the ground that he was in condition to pro-
perly take care of her, 'earning a good, salary, etc. 
Mter stating that, where there is an apparent gift 
of a child, and the child is thereafter left and neglected 
by the parent, he may be held to have lost his natural 
and parental rights to its custody, and the Court said: 
''Furthermore, if the parties to whom the 
custody of a child is thus committed rely thereon 
and accept and assume the duties and obligations 
to nurture and maintain the child, and in so doing 
use extensively of their means and physical ener-
gies for a period of years, and all the while there 
were forming strong mutual attachments of the 
affections by reason of such associations, it may 
well be held that they have acquired rights with 
respect to its custody and control which are para-
mount to the rights of the parent. Humel v. PM-
rish, supra; H~arrison v. H arkett, supra.'' 
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W~alto.n. v. Cofj'marn, 169 P. (2) 97. This case holds 
that any presumption that it will be for the best interest 
and welfare of the child to be reared under the care, 
custody and control of its natural parents is one of fact 
and not of law, and may be overcome by any competent 
evidence which is sufficient to satisfy a reasonable mind 
thereon. 
The mother was seeking to get custody of her two 
children away from their grandmother. She was divorced 
from the father of the children, and remarried, and dur-
ing a time was required to work. She lived with her 
parents for a while, remarried, leaving one of the chil-
dren, Bobby, 'vith her ;parents, and taking Marilyn with 
her. There was some dispute as to how long Bobby had 
lived with his grandparents, but neither of the children 
lived with the grandparents anywhere near as continu-
ously or for such a ·period of time as did Janet here. 
There was also a proceeding in the Juvenile Court, 
and, by stipulation, the matter was finally tried in the 
District Court, as here. There were some admissions of 
previous misconduct on the part of the mother, and evi-
dence of reform and change in this respect, and the con-
tention that she had never intended permanently to sur-
render the custody of the children. 
The Court indicated that this appeared to be true, 
at least so far as Marilyn was concerned. The Utah cases 
are reviewed at some length, particularly on the question 
of surrender of right of custody. This is very much more 
apparent in the case at bar, than in the case under con-
sideration. 
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The Court points out the consideration to be given 
to the findings of the trial court, and that, while the 
Supreme Court, in this character of action, may re-
examine the records, it is said: 
'~In so doing we should keep in n1ind that 
the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses and 
observed their demeanor and was acquainted with 
the circun1stances surrounding the giving of their 
testimony, and therefore was in a better position 
than we are to weigh and evaluate their evidence. 
Sta.n.Zey v. Starnley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465, con-
curring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe cominencing 
at page 527 o~ 97 Utah, 94 P. 2d 465.'' 
Custody was by this Court awarded to the grand-· 
mother. 
Another thing that is particularly important here is 
the inconclusiveness of the evidence to establish the 
com~plete reliability and stability of D·e Von, in the case at 
bar, as of the mother in the case under consideration. 
The following language is particularly pertinent here: 
''The only real home that Bobby ha.s known 
is the home of the defendants, and Marilyn has 
lived there much of her life. Both are attached 
and adjusted to the home life of the defendants, 
and the defendants are very much attached to 
them. 'These children are more attached to the 
defendants than to their own mother. This was 
demonstrated by Marilyn on the last night when 
her mother left the defendant's home. As she 
left, Virginia asked Ma.rilyn if she was not com-
ing, but Marilyn did not go with her. At that time 
her grandmother had no opportunity to teach 
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her to rnake that choice because 1iarilyn had been 
living with her mother. Again when Virginia 
attempted to take the children by force both re-
sisted her. Twice during the trial each when ques-
tioned privately by the trial judge chose to go 
to their grandparents.'' 
All the foregoing cases were decided prior to Samp-
sell v. Holt, supra, holding that the statute gives no 
absolute right of custody to the mother. 
The following quite recent cases, from other juris-
dictions, hold that a parent may waive, by act or con-
duct, any preferred claim of right of custody, and is 
not entitled to take a child, when placed or left with 
grand or foster-parents until an attaclunent grows up 
between them and the child. 
Haynes v. Fi.Zlner (Mont.) 75 P. (2) 802. 
(This case cites cases fron1 several other jur-
isdictions. Some of these consider the happiness 
of the child as an elen1ent of its welfare.) 
Graves v. French (Ark.) 191 S.W. (2) 590. 
Hart v. Howell (Fla.) 19 So. (2) 317. 
We recognize, as do the cases, that a child is not 
a chattel, to be given away regardless of its own welfare. 
But, it seems, also, to he universally re-cognized that, 
where a parent voluntarily places a child with a grand-
parent, and thus establishes and acquiesces in this new 
relationship, any 'original right of the parent is not of 
conclusive importance. 
Sorne of the matters, more appropriately discussed 
under the following ·points, apply to this Point No. 1, also. 
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POINT NO. II 
This point is that the finding, quoted by appellant, 
is not supported by the evidence .. On the a.rgmnent, how-
ever, no effort is 1nade to show that it was not supported. 
It is contended, only, that something additional, and as 
to the Juvenile. Court's jurisdiction being temporary, 
should have been found. 
While this finding is supported, it, of itself, is of 
no great i1nportance. If not supported, it would not have 
any affect upon the conclusions and judgments of the 
court. The findings, however, in this divorce proceeding 
recited ( 6) that both parents of Janet ''were deprived of 
the custody of the minor child'' by the Juvenile Court, 
and the custody awarded to the mother of defendant. 
Apparently, DeVon had neglected to a~pply the Navy 
allotment to the care. of Janet, and the Red Cross 
started investigating this in April or May of 1944, and 
had contacted the Juvenile Court in this connection. 
They and the father, N eldon, had also contacted De Von. 
POINT NO. III 
This point is that there is no evidence to support 
the finding quoted at Page 34 of appellant's brief, and 
that this is contrary to the evidence. 
If this contention is correct, it may be of some, 
although not conclusive, importance here. It is, how-
ever, not correct. 
The first finding, that it does not appear that ap-
pellant owns any property in her own right is true, by 
the record. The home and the stock interests and salary 
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rnentioned by Mr. Oliver, were testified as being owned 
by hin1. This is not denied. 
The finding goes to the matter of certainty or perm-
anence of the affluence asserted as a financial change, 
so far as DeVon is concerned. There was no testimony 
that she owns any property. California community pro-
perty law cannot be asserted here, without its being 
pleaded, nor do we understand that it provides that she 
has a present interest in her huband's property, or that 
it prevents.him from holding p-roperty, and, particularly, 
if acquired before marriage, in which she would never 
have a community interest. 
The findings that De \ 1 on did not contribute to 
Janet's support, when she might ;have done so, and that 
there is no evidence of any great affection for Janet, 
will be considered together. 
She testified ( 108) that, while working in the ship-
yard in Portland, she received as much as $85.80 a week 
( 109). That her checks were not uniform, and this one 
was as high as any she recalls getting. When she was 
. getting this salary, at least for some time, she was also 
getting the $80.00 per month allotment from the Navy, 
and she got $50.00 of this all the time from December 
1943 up to Dece1nher 13, 1945, when N eldon was dis-
charged ( 121, 173). 
If we count only four weeks to the month, to allow 
for variance in these monthly checks, this would amount 
to $353.20 per n1onth, plus the $80.00, or $433.20. She 
says she did contribute but not any specific amounts. 
Her testimony is very· illusive. She said, ''I don't know; 
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so1netimes a Ten Dollar bill; son1etimes Twenty'' ( 109). 
She did not remen1ber giving Janet ''any presents at 
that time. ' ' 
Ordell Hardcastle testified, and her testilnony, 
throughout, was entitled to full belief, that De Von sent 
$20.00, only. That this 'vas sent to Bonnie; $5.00 .to pay 
a debt, and $15.00 for Janet, and that this $15.00 was 
all she ever did send or give for Janet's support, 
although she did give Janet $10.00 as a gift, and this, 
Janet still had at the time of trial ( 323). 
There were some few trinkets and items of clothing 
received by Janet by or through DeVon's mother, over 
the six years. These were not of any great value or 
importance. 
Oertainly, DeVon, living in the dormitory with 
other girls in Portland, as she testified (111-112), could 
have contributed to Janet's support substantially and 
regularly, at that time. 
That she has not contributed since being married 
to Mr. Oliver is true, by. all the festmony. This is sig-
nificant, now that it is claimed she can allegedly supply 
Janet with all the comforts and luxuries of life. 
She was married to her second husband November 
9, 1946, and started proceedings for the custody of 
Janet in the Juvenile Court August 13, 1948. During that 
~period, and ever since, she has supplied no support, 
when, by her own testimony, she could have aided sub-
stantially. 'This part of the finding is fully supported. 
As to the finding that ''there is no evidence of great 
affection'' for Janet, the foregoing, and the entire record, 
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support this. There are some incidents particularly 
emphasizing it. 
On May 29, 1944, DeVon called Ordell to go to Bing-
ham and take the baby. Ordell had gone to the hospital, 
because her husband had been sent there. This was after 
the threat to Janet, and the wire from the father, N eldon, 
asking Or dell to look after Janet. 
At Binghan1, she found nobody at the home of 
D·e\Ton's mother, and inquiries, up to 12:30 that night, 
failed to locate them. At 4:00 o'clock in the morning, 
De \Ton and some fellow came to Ordell's home, bringing 
the baby and its basket, chair, and clothes (220). It 
was then that De\' on said, ''Here is the baby; you can 
have her," and that she would sign any papers. 
And now, this uncontradicted testimony: ''And 
fron1 then on, every ti1ne that baby was in our house, she 
never took care of her one bit.'' And, also from that 
tiiue on, ''she didn't say anything about wanting the 
baby.'' 
DeVon was there the next three months, almost con.:. 
tinuously. Janet was six months old. She must have 
required, and was given, a lot of care by Ordell. Yet, 
there is no claim that De Von gave her any. 
There is another instance, connected with Janet's 
allegedly being without shoes. DeVon testified that she 
had no shoes on, and that Ordell said that she had no 
shoes ( 116). · This was in August of 1948, after she 
had become affluent. And, though she pretended she 
believed that this child had no shoes, she did nothing 
about it. Incidentally, Ordell testified that the child was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•)•) 
.-a) 
out 'vith 'One of the boys, 'vho was irrigating the orchard, 
and that she had taken off her shoes to wade in the 
furrows ( 230). 
It see1ns significant that neither DeVon nor her 
husband have tendered anything here for the years of 
expense and service in the care of Janet. On the other 
hand, they are continuously building up expenses, which 
Ordell has been and is compelled to pay, in order to 
protect Janet against, what she sincerely believes to be 
threatened, fear, abuse, or neglect. This includes, what 
seems to us to be, the unjustifiable ap·peal of this ca.se. 
It, also, serves to emphasize the great devotion of Ordell 
to this child. 
De \7 .. on left here in August or September of 1944. 
There is no compelling reason shown for her going away 
from the baby at that time. She had been getting and 
keeping the $80.00 allotment, including the baby's portion 
of $30.00, since December of 1943. If she wanted to 
work, it is common knowledge that jobs were plentiful 
here, at good pay, in 1944. She then chose not to be 
near the child. 
She came back, and saw her only when she came 
for some other purpose, as for her divorce in 1946, and 
to instigate proceeding in 1948. It all adds up to the 
complete support of the Court's finding. These findings 
clearly support the conclusion and judgment here. 
We have ignored the testimony of appellant as 
to DeVon's living conditions and sister's health at the 
time she got her divorce, in 1944. This was on the alle-
gation of an agreement, at that time, that appellant 
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could have the child when her circumstances were such 
that she could care for it (14). This was not shown. 
Appellant, while reciting this evidence at some length, 
apparently claims nothing for it. And, the Court's 
finding ( 49) that there was no such understanding, and 
that no such suggestion ever reached Ordell, is fully 
supported, and not questioned here. The award of cus-
tody to Ordell in 1946 must be presumed to rest upon 
good reason therefor. These were not questioned, or 
gone into, and, it seems, could not be, on this petition. 
POINT NO. IV 
This point is that the finding, or conclusion, of the 
Court that the "ultimate" best interests of the child 
will be served by leaving her custody with the grand-
mother is contrary to the evidence. 
Appellant does not quite accurately state this. It is,. 
as follows (51) : 
• '6. The background of deep devotion, affec-
tion, and care by Ordell Hardcastle to and for 
the child Janet, and the mutual love and affection 
between them, assures that the welfare of the 
child is safe in this custody and care, and that her 
well-being will he best assured by keeping her 
within the jurisdiction of the court and within the 
area of her father's responsibility. There is no 
sufficient evidence or background in referenee to 
the relationship between Janet and plaintiff as 
to safely assure that the child's welfare or best 
interest would be served by modifying the dec.ree 
herein, so as to allo'v her re1noval fron1 the State 
of Utah." 
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This follows other findings, conclusively detertnin-
lng: 
1. That the conditions of the ho1ne of Janet have, 
in all respects, in1proved since the time Janet was placed 
there by her n1other and by the Juvenile and District 
Courts (50), and are still in1proving. The finding, fur-
ther, is that there is nothing in the conditions or en-
vironment of the home that threaten the health or well-
being of Janet. These findings are supported, and not 
questioned here. 
2. And, it is found, as stated above, and fully sup-
•ported, that there was no understanding that the decree 
of May 8, 1946, in this case, as to custody, ~ould or 
could thereafter be modified or changed, or the reasons 
therefor impeached. This finding is not questioned. 
The only other matter alleged as basis for changing 
the custody, as decreed, has to do with the alleged change 
or betterment in' the financial conditions of De Von. The 
Court finds, in this connection, that the background and 
devotion of Ordell, and their mutual love, insures that 
the child's welfare is safe in her custody. It indicates 
that the evidence is insufficient as to the background of 
DeVon, to give the same insurance. 
Appellant dwells at considerable length upon De-
Von's youth. She was, and is, young. At the time thiS 
proceeding was brought, she was, apparently, 19 or 
20 years old. She is entitled to sympathy, .because of this 
lack of experience in meeting her problems, and, if she 
made slips, most of us can be tolerant of these, and 
everyone, we think, would be pleased if she should come 
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to acquire the fine qualities of character, stability, and 
industry that Ordell now has. 
However, neither sympathy for her youth nor de-
sires for the future can affect the decision as to the secur-
ity of Janet, which the trial court was required to, and 
did, make. The Court, on this, had to deal with condi-
tions as they are. 
Appellant, on this Point No. 4, interpolates the 
word ''ultimate'' welfare, and argues that Or dell can-
• I 
not give Janet a college education. But, as pointed out 
in the Washington case of Schorno v. Schorno, supra, 
there is nothing in this decision to prevent De \Ton from 
doing so, when that stage is reached .. 
It is &pparent that Ordell has not disparaged, and 
is not vindictive, towards De Von. She was willing, as 
she testified, to take her into her home as one of her own 
children, and to have continued to do so. On De \ron's 
visits, she was always friendly, and fully cooperative. 
·She pleaded for her and Neldon to be reunited, for 
Janet's good. She kept De \Ton's picture for Janet, and 
sent Janet's picture to De \ron. She praised De \ron to 
Janet, and even tried to convince her that, if eventu-
alities so resulted, she would have a nice home in Cali-
fornia with her mother. 
In the pleadings, and on her evidence here, she made 
no attack upon De Von, although this Court has said that 
cases like this are often bitter. True, she mentioned 
De \7 on's smoking, and, on one occasion, drinking, but 
that 'vas only when pressed, on cross-examination. She 
evidenced no exception to or hatred on account of this. 
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'V e believe that the Court, s conclusion that there is 
not shown the background of stability, devotion, or relia-
bility to insure that Janet's welfare would be bettered by 
the change sought, is clearly right. This new 1narriage 
and affluence could be prolonged or short-lived. Janet 
would be a virtual stranger and step--child; second, cer-
tainly, to the younger baby in the Oliver home. 
But, on the other hand, the Olivers can do much 
to improve the background, and, as Janet gets older, 
to allay her fears, and, perhaps, eventually satisfy 
Ordell that Janet would be benefitted by being down 
there. In short, the friendship and confide~ce can be 
:.built up, all around. We are certain that Ordell will 
not stand in the way of what, she is satisfied, would he 
for Janet's good, whether it is a college education, or 
whatever it may be. 
In addition to Ordell's deep concern for Janet, it 
is important to ~point out that the District Court, having 
jurisdiction here, is charged with protecting Janet's 
welfare. The Court, in this case, could not insure this 
protection if she were taken from the State and from the 
jurisdiction. The Hardcastles, in their circumstances, 
could never know how she was treated. This is one of 
Ordell 's chief concerns. 
As indicated, also, in the Court's finding, as above 
quoted, if Janet is kept within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, she is within the area of her father's responsi-
bility also. In addition to this, his rights and interests in 
his child are enti tied to consideration. 
Alley v. Alley, 247 P. 301, supra, points out the 
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importance of keeping the child within the jurisdiction, 
and states that the trial court, ''if possible'' should 
''always maintain control ot the child and retain it within 
the jurisdiction of the court so as to protect it against 
harmful influences and to preserve its welfare . . . '' 
State v. Sorensen., 132 P. (2) 132, 135, supra. In this 
,case, the Court again emphasizes this, and quotes the 
above language from the above case, and cites other Utah 
cases. 
In a case of this character, where the very persons, 
seeking to have the custody of the child involved, were 
before the trial Court, so that the Court has opportunity 
to obse·rve their attitude and judge of their characters, it 
seems that his judgment and discretion should not be 
interferred with, unless a clear abuse is shown. 
Noon v. Noon, 191 P. (2.) 35,_ 38 states and recites this 
rule, and sup·ports it by the citation of a number of 
cases. 
Schorno v. Bphorrno, 172 P. (2) 474, cited supra, at 
p. 478, says, in reference to this kind of a case: 
"We have recognized that the trial court 
must necessarily have a wide discretion in such 
matters. This must be so because there are so 
many factors that must be taken into considera-
tion, and these can become better known by the 
trial judge than they can by us from the printed 
record.'' 
In Walton v. Coffm~, 169 P. (2) 97, 103, this Court 
states substantially the principles recited in the above 
two cases. 
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'Ve respectfully subn1it that the findings and con-
elusions and judgment of the trial court are fully justi-
fied and sustained by the record, and should be affirmed. 
~lULLlNER, PRINCE and MUI_.~LINER 
Attorneys for R-espondents 
, 
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